United Nations (UN) 聽has historically been the gold standard for legitimate, inclusive international climate governance. Leveraging universal participation and consensus-based decision-making, it balances States鈥� sovereignty over their natural resources with the need for collective action to address transnational environmental challenges. In January 2026, the 鈥淏iodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement鈥� () reached the 60-ratification threshold and entered into force as the first legally binding global framework for marine life sustainability in international waters. It addresses the regulation lacuna on depletion of the high seas, which account for 聽of our ocean. And yet in August 2025, the resumed fifth negotiations session for a 鈥淕lobal Plastics Treaty鈥� () collapsed again, with a finalised framework . Given the 聽of plastic pollution, why does protection for the high seas succeed where regulating plastics does not? The treaty development process is exposed to States鈥� political economy, undermining resolve to pursue ambitious environmental policy perceived as being contrary to short-term political and economic interests. With powerful non-State actors and geopolitics provoking protectionism, multilateral treaty-making is increasingly insufficient as the principal form of international climate governance.
The Influence of Political Economy
Agreement in UN multilateral treaty-making is contingent upon achieving tacit 鈥溾�� when no State formally objects, requiring alignment of each State鈥檚 own interests with collective environmental goals. While the BBNJ required almost 聽of negotiation, it capitalised on the mutual gain聽of protecting the world鈥檚 largest . Averting a race to the bottom where overexploitation collapses shared ocean ecosystems aligned biodiversity and environmental concerns with geoeconomic interests, such as for marine research and resources. Importantly, the BBNJ includes all five countries responsible for 聽of this 鈥渄istant-water fishing鈥濃�揅hina (and Taiwan), Japan, Korea, and Spain. For these countries, participation and environmental diplomacy 聽inside leverage to shape regulations and geopolitical influence. While the BBNJ attracted 聽for making certain compromises, such as lacking robust enforcement measures for information and technology sharing, it is considered a 聽in ocean protection.
Conversely, governments are incentivised to block regulation that exposes them to economic or political risk, especially that which compromises powerful vested interests. Plastic pollution harms across collective, national, and local levels; the plastics industry 聽3.4 per cent of GHG emissions, and the ~80% of plastic produced 聽our oceans, terrestrial ecosystems, and our own bodies. And yet, despite 聽for the GPT to regulate downstream waste management and reduce single-use plastics, upstream production remains an . A small of the 鈥搃ncluding Saudi Arabia, the US, and Russia鈥搊ppose the cap for production of virgin plastics and controls on production chemicals. Over 聽of plastics are derived from fossil fuel chemicals鈥搊ne of the only remaining growing markets. Faced with the impact of controlling plastic production on local fossil fuel and petrochemical industries, and the 聽of lobbyists attending the negotiations, these counties prioritise their political and economic vested interests above environmental needs. This has only been exacerbated by a 聽marked by high perceived , where countries are increasingly viewing ambitious environmental commitments with suspicion about free-riders and undermining their competitive advantage. The optimism of the 1990s 鈥溾�濃�搘ith rapid proliferation of international treaties and trade liberalisation鈥搃s at odds with of influential economies seeking to derisk supply chains and strengthen domestic industries. As such, the plastic-producing States continue to oppose consensus to force a deadlock, or to drag ambitious policy to a lowest-common-denominator 鈥渢oothless tiger鈥� with vague commitments and little enforcement power.
So, What Now?
UN multilateral treaty-making is the archetypal form of coordinated international climate governance. It reflects that global challenges do not respect national borders, and the BBNJ demonstrates that a focus on mutual gain and majority voting can deliver. However, States are increasingly beholden to the influence of political economy, seeking to protect the vested interests of powerful non-government actors and preserve competitive advantage in a tense geostrategic climate. Continued failure to resolve the GPT is , and hardline positions appear to leave 聽toward consensus. Most participants support a treaty covering the entire plastic lifecycle, including the European Union and recently China鈥搕he world鈥檚 largest plastic producer, seemingly pursuing the environmental left by the US. Hence, there is support to allow , similar to , or to create a 鈥溾�� amongst a willing coalition outside of the UN. A broadly supported, independent treaty luddite States to unify their regulations to ensure access to international markets. But, the speed of coalition models lack the inclusiveness and legitimacy of universal UN processes, and risk marginalising the voices of smaller States. Market-based mechanisms that aim to internalise the costs of plastic pollution, such as through taxing non-compliant plastics or building circular economy infrastructure, also offer alternate pathways to action, however, may .
Governments are expected to return to GPT negotiations later this year under a , yet there is 聽about the value of further dialogue. Where treaty-making requires subordinating short-term economic and political interests鈥搊f the nation or its industries鈥搕o shared environmental objectives, negotiations contingent on universal consensus risk agreements that are either too weak or never even concluded. Willing participants must cooperate to pursue alternative pathways that produce fit-for-purpose, ambitious international environment law. Legitimacy is important, but legitimacy without delivery is not governance. Against the backdrop of global environmental challenges, it is effective international governance and collective action that we need.
was originally produced as part of the Fellowship Program. YAIA is Australia鈥檚 leading youth-led organisation providing opportunities for young people to engage in international affairs.聽
Mikey Glover is the 2026 Climate and Environment Fellow for Young Australians in International Affairs (YAIA).聽The 2026 Climate and Environment Fellow is sponsored by the Sydney Environment Institute.
Disclaimer:聽The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Young Australians in International Affairs or the Sydney Environment Institute. All content is original, and no plagiarism has been used in the preparation of this article.
Header image:聽Matthew T Rader, , License , via Wikimedia Commons.